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Given that this kind of argument-based reasoning and decision making is ubiquitous, it isn't surprising that argumentation itself has emerged as a scientific field. It studies how to model arguments and their relationships, with the ultimate goal of solving conflicts in the presence of diverging opinions. Thus, argumentation has also been referred to as reasoning tested by doubt (Guillermo R. Simari credits David Zarefsky with this definition). Argumentation has become a major focus of research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) over the last two decades. It is strongly connected and highly beneficial to various other AI subfields, in particular knowledge representation, nonmonotonic reasoning, and multi-agent systems. It has been successfully applied to legal reasoning, which uses argumentation principles to formulate legal cases as arguments. Moreover, it has proved valuable in decision support for resolving conflicts between different opinions and in the context of dialogues and persuasion. Finally, argumentation techniques can be found in expert systems in areas ranging from medicine to eGovernment. Due to space restrictions, we had to be selective with our references; more details can be found in the extended version of this article. 1 Within argumentation, we can distinguish two major lines of research: logic-based and abstract approaches. The former takes into account the logical structure of arguments and defines notions such as attack, undercut, and defensibility in terms of logical properties of the chosen argument structures. In contrast, abstract approaches-the topic of this article-consider arguments as atomic items, focusing entirely on the relations between them. Consequently, the arguments and the relevant A ssume you have to make an important decision, such as whether to accept a job you've been offered. The conclusion you have to reach will hardly be a simple deductive one. Most likely, you'll construct arguments in favor of the new job (such as a better salary or better prospects for the future) and relations between them are assumed to have already been constructed, usually from a given background knowledge base. The obtained argumentation system is then evaluated on the abstract level, yielding possibly alternative sets of (abstract) arguments that may be collectively accepted. Finally, these results are interpreted in terms of the original knowledge base. This three-step creation, evaluation, and interpretation process is known as the argumentation process or instantiationbased argumentation. 2, 3 This method provides a high degree of modularity, as solving a given problem is kept on an abstract level, detached from a particular representation in the modeling language used in the knowledge base. This article gives an overview of the most popular argumentation systems for this abstract level.
Research Directions in Argumentation
Phan Minh Dung introduced what are currently the most prominent abstract systems for argumentation. 4 They are equipped with various types of semantics used for their evaluation. In a nutshell, Dung's argumentation frameworks (AFs) are directed graphs, with the vertices being the abstract arguments and the directed edges corresponding to attacks between them. Conflicts are resolved using appropriate semantics. The different semantics reflect the different intuitions about what can be considered reasonable, thus providing a suite of calculi of opposition. They produce acceptable subsets of the arguments, called extensions, corresponding to various positions that someone might take in light of the available arguments. Crucial here are the concepts of conflict-freeness and admissibility. Based on them more advanced semantics have been defined, ranging from Dung's original stable, preferred, and grounded semantics to the more recent semi-stable, ideal and cf2-semantics. 5 Recent studies have shown, however, that within the argumentation process the construction of proper AFs can cause much more concern than expected. 2, 6 Attention must be given to avoid the risk of violating some natural rationality postulates in the overall instantiation-based argumentation process. Indeed, generating the right argumentation structures is the crucial step here for yielding reasonable-and consistent-output.
In general, the more expressive the modeling languages become, the more involved the instantiation step grows. Consequently, the generated AFs might turn out to be far from natural. For instance, recent formal systems such as ASPIC+ 7 and Carneades 8 provide various useful syntactical features, in particular, a separation between strict and defeasible rules, different types of premises and proof standards, preferential information, and the like. This makes the modeling language expressive yet results in a rather complicated instantiation, and it's not always easy to see whether the instantiation performs correctly.
However, our view is that the general idea underlying the abstract, instantiation-based approach to argumentation is still valid. The modularity of this method provides the flexibility needed in response to changes in the modeling languages. We believe that the mentioned results suggest that Dung's AFs might not be the best target systems for the instantiation. Indeed, their expressive abilities are limited due to the fact that we have only a binary conflict at hand. This can make modeling, for example, collective 9 or supportive 10 relations unpleasant if not problematic.
Currently, two research directions aim to address such problems and bridge the gap between the modeling languages and AFs. The first, meta-argumentation, 11, 12 lets us stay within Dung's well-established setting. However, it comes at the cost of auxiliary arguments, which are required to represent relations other than attack. The second research direction focuses on extending AFs by equipping them with more expressive concepts to model the aforementioned situations, such as preferences or support relations. Compared to the meta-argumentation approach, the main challenge of the new frameworks is to correspondingly generalize the semantical concepts. They must not only fit the extended frameworks, but also remain intuitive and relatively compatible with the original structures. 13 The primary objective of this article is to give an overview of the currently available generalizations of Dung's framework. In the interest of space, we'll keep our discussion on a rather informal level but try to raise awareness of the difficulties that arise in this vivid and interesting branch of research in the argumentation community.
Dung's Argumentation Frameworks
In his seminal paper, Dung showed that it's possible to analyze acceptability of arguments in an abstract way, independently of where the arguments come from and how they're generated. 4 Moreover, he aimed to represent different types of nonmonotonic approaches in a uniform setting. To this end, he introduced his abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs), a surprisingly simple concept. An AF is thus nothing but a directed graph with a specific intuitive interpretation of nodes and links. Because there are no restrictions on the attack relation, cycles, self-attackers, and so on, are allowed. Arguments don't have any particular structure and the precise conditions for their acceptance are defined by the semantics. In what follows, we'll present several such semantics, originally defined by Dung.
Let F = (A, R) be an AF. Assume a rational agent accepts a subset S of A. What properties would we expect S to satisfy? First of all, it seems reasonable to require consistency-that is, that the arguments in S don't attack each other. We say S ⊆ A is conflict-free (in F) whenever there are no x, y ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ R. However, this is still insufficient. In real life, we're often forced to counter the arguments of opponents whose opinion conflicts with ours. We say a set of arguments S ⊆ A is admissible (in F) whenever S is conflict-free in F and S can defend itself against outside attacks. By this we mean that if there's an x ∈ A and some y ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ R (an element of A attacks an element of S), then S must contain some element z defending y-that is, (z, x) ∈ R for some z ∈ S.
Admissible sets are good candidates for the sets of arguments that a rational agent can adopt. However, not all of them are interesting. The empty set, for instance, is admissible for each AF. Not accepting arguments without any reason can certainly not be viewed as rational. This is why Dung focuses on further notions. A set of arguments S ⊆ A is complete iff it's admissible and already contains all arguments defended by S. In other words, each argument whose attackers are attacked by S must be in S. This notion can be further strengthened to preferred extensions, which simply are the (subset) maximal admissible sets. A somewhat stronger notion than preferred extensions are stable extensions. Stable extensions are conflict-free subsets of A that attack each argument not in S: a conflict-free set S is a stable extension if for each x ∈ A\S there's y ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R. Please note that contrary to the other notions discussed here, stable extensions aren't guaranteed to exist.
The grounded extension contains all and only arguments whose defense can be traced back to any of the unattacked arguments. Every framework has precisely one such set, even if it's empty. The grounded extension S of an AF can be generated iteratively as follows: starting with the empty set, we first include in the set S all those arguments that aren't attacked at all. We then remove them from the framework, along with all arguments T attacked by S (together with all attacks between arguments from S and T). We continue like this, adding to S in each step arguments unattacked in the reduced AF and remove them, until we reach a fixpoint-that is, until no further unattacked arguments can be found this way. The conflict-free sets of F 1 are {a 1 , a 3 }, {a 1 , a 4 }, {a 2 , a 4 } and all their subsets. The admissible sets of F 1 are ∅, {a 1 }, {a 3 }, and {a 4 }, as well as {a 1 , a 3 } and {a 1 , a 4 }. Note that, for instance, {a 2 , a 4 } is not admissible because a 2 isn't defended by that set against its attacker a 1 (it is, however, defended against a 3 ). We have three complete extensions of F 1 : {a 1 }, {a 1 , a 3 }, and {a 1 , a 4 }. The latter two are the preferred extensions; however, only {a 1 , a 4 } is stable. Finally, the grounded extension consists of the single argument a 1 .
Various alternative definitions of AF semantics have been defined. 5 Most prominent are the labelingbased approaches, 14 which, instead of generating sets of accepted arguments, provide us with three-valued (true, false, undecided) interpretations. However, for our purposes, the notions we've introduced are sufficient. Moreover, we do not aim here to discuss computational properties such as complexity or expressiveness; in-depth analysis of these topics can be found in relevant sources. [15] [16] [17] An additional overview of systems for abstract argumentation is available in further works. 18 
Preferences and Values
In decision-making scenarios, we're often faced with pro and con arguments, and our decisions are based on preferences among these arguments. Thus, it's natural to apply preference-handling techniques in argumentation. In fact, this was done even before abstract argumentation as such had emerged, 19 where an argument's strength is measured in terms of the specificity of the underlying information. 20 Including the preference information in argumentation frameworks not only lets us model the problem more accurately, it also reduces the number of extensions we can obtain.
Generalizations of AFs that include preferences, the preference-based argumentation frameworks (PAFs), 21, 22 are defined as follows: 
Definition 2. A preference-based argumentation framework (PAF) is a tuple (A, R, ≥) where A is a set of rguments, R ⊆ A × A is the attack relation, and ≥⊆ A × A is a (partial or total) preorder representing preference.
The evaluation of arguments is then based on a simple idea: whenever a strictly less-preferred argument a attacks a more-preferred argument b (a is strictly less preferred than b, denoted b > a, if b ≥ a and not a ≥ b), then the attack (a, b) ∈ R is simply disregarded. This means that the given PAF, PF = (A, R, ≥), is used to generate a standard
This AF is then used to define the semantics of the PAF.
Trevor Bench-Capon's value-based argumentation frameworks (VAFs) are based on similar ideas. 23 However, VAFs assume that arguments promote specific values, and the preferences are among these values rather than between the arguments themselves. Again, the evaluation of a VAF is based on the generation of an AF. Here, attacks are disregarded whenever the attacked argument promotes a more preferred value than the attacker. VAFs were further generalized to include different audiences that might disagree about the preferences among values. A comparison of PAFs and VAFs is available in further works (see the "Further Reading in Argumentation Frameworks" sidebar).
In many argumentation contexts, preferences or values themselves are a matter of debate. Thus, it's useful to have frameworks in which it's not only possible to reason and argue with preferences, but also about preferences. This observation led to the development of extended argumentation frameworks (EAFs). 24 Here, reasoning about preferences is modeled by allowing an argument to attack not only other arguments, but also other attacks. In this way, an attack (a, b) can be dynamically disabled if, say, an argument that intuitively expresses that b should be preferred to a is accepted. The main idea behind EAFs is that preferences can be based on arguments themselves, and as such, they generate a more advanced conflict relation where other attacks can be overridden. The constraint included in the definition states that arguments representing opposite preferences should also be mutually in conflict in the framework. Although the definitions substantially differ from the ones in PAFs and VAFs, the intuition remains similar. Instead of attacks, we focus on defeats with respect to some set S: we say that xdefeats s y if (x, y) ∈ R, and there's no z in S such that (z, (x, y)) ∈ D. Conflict-free extensions then disregard attacks that aren't defeats, assuming that the attack isn't symmetric. Intuitively, admissibility is also limited to the successful attacks (that is, defeats). Defense is now based on defeats: that is, given a set S, for every y such that ydefeats s x where x ∈ S, there exists an argument z ∈ S s.t. zdefeats s y. What's unique in EAFs is that this semantics is later strengthened by ensuring a particular type of defense for the (z, y) defeat itself, referred to as reinstatement. Based on this, all further semantics follow naturally and generalize Dung's original ones. 24 The initial idea behind evaluating the preference (value-based) frameworks was to disregard a conflict if the attacked argument was stronger than its attacker (or if the attack itself was attacked in the case of EAFs) and focus on the remaining relations. This treatment can result in extensions that don't follow the traditional intuition behind conflict-freeness, and, depending on how we understand preferences, they can be seen as intended 24 or not intended. 22 In the latter case, the cited work also proposes a new approach toward semantics for PAFs that aims to fix such issues and as such presents a different type of reasoning than in Dung's frameworks. Instead of being driven by acceptability, it uses a dominance relation to establish whether a set of arguments (candidate for an extension) is better than another. The initial relation is described in terms of postulates that incorporate conflict-freeness and the behavior of attacks in the PAF setting. It's then further adjusted, depending on the (Dung-style) semantics that is to be generalized. The extensions are represented by the maximal elements of the dominance relation. Although preferences assign different levels of importance to arguments, the relation between arguments remains purely conflicting.
Relationships beyond Attack
Dung's frameworks consider only a single relationship among arguments, namely attack. In various contexts it's natural to go beyond conflict. In particular, the ability to model various notions of support appears useful.
This observation has led to the development of bipolar argumentation frameworks, where both relations are modeled. 10, 25 Definition 5. A bipolar argumentation framework (BAF) is a tuple (A, R att , R sup ) where A is a set of arguments, R att ⊆ A × A represents the attack A detailed discussion of related works was omitted due to space constraints, but we provide some pointers here. Further work on preferences includes audience-specific argumentation frameworks in which arguments can promote multiple values, 1 uniform argumentation frameworks, 2 and multi-contextual preference-based argumentation frameworks. 3 Other generalizations incorporate probabilities 4, 5 and certain forms of weights. [6] [7] [8] Frameworks focusing on generalizing the relations between arguments include the set-attack argumentation framework (SETAF) 9 approach, which formalizes the concept of sets of attacking arguments. Moreover, there exists the argumentation framework with recursive attacks (AFRAs), 10 in which not only arguments but also attacks can be attacked (similar to the EAF approach but without any limitations, and motivated from a different angle). Finally, we have argumentation frameworks with necessities (AFNs), another type of bipolar structure that focuses on necessary support. 11 As we've discussed, ADFs go even further trying to capture many of the aforementioned generalizations at once. Closely related to ADFs are constrained argumentation frameworks (CAFs), 12 Weydert's hyperframeworks, 13 and equational argumentation networks (EANs). 14 The main difference between CAFs and ADFs is that CAFs use relations to filter the extensions, whereas ADFs exploit them during the extension computation. The motivations behind the hyperframeworks and EANs are close to the one behind ADFs. However, they leave a lot of detail to the user and lack ADFs' combination of simplicity and flexibility.
Coming back to the entire argumentation process as described in the main article, let us mention that research on instantiations in the context of ADFs 15 has recently emerged. In addition, efficient implementations 16 are now available, making ADFs a valuable tool to experiment with as well as to better understand weaker generalizations of Dung's AFs. ADFs provide a highly useful interface between modeling languages on one hand and AF-based implementation techniques on the other. In other words, ADFs act as argumentation middleware, bridging the gap between highly complex argumentation applications and the core abstract frameworks of Dung (as higher-order programming languages are used to implement algorithms but aren't intended to replace machine code). This view is backed up by polynomial compilations from ADFs to AFs, which preserve at least some of the ADF semantics. 17 As with the meta-argumentation approach, additional arguments are needed for this purpose. Even if one is willing to stick to AF-based implementation techniques, ADFs provide a useful interface between the more complex nonabstract modeling languages on one hand and the purely Dung layer on the other. relation, and R sup ⊆ A × A represents the support relation. We require that R att ∩ R sup = ∅.
Including a new type of relation requires a careful adaptation of the existing semantics. The combination of attack and support leads to indirect attacks, originally referred to as complex attacks. 10 For instance, there is a supported attack from a 1 to b if there's a sequence of support links from a 1 to a n and an attack from a n to b. There's a secondary attack from b to a n if there's a sequence of support links from a 1 to a n and an attack from b to a 1 . A mediated attack from b to a 1 takes place if there's a sequence of support links a 1 to a n and an attack from b to a n . For the generalization of Dung-style semantics to BAFs, these indirect, complex notions of attack then need to be taken into account adequately. There are various ways of doing this, and what's adequate depends on the specific interpretation of the support.
Example 2.
We now show some of the complex attacks. Let BF 1 = (A, R att , R sup ) with A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5, a 6 }, R att = {(a 3 , a 4 ), (a 6 , a 5 )} and R sup = { (a 1 , a 2 ), (a 2 , a 3 ) , (a 4 , a 5 )} as depicted in Figure 2 . The normal attacks are depicted with normal lines, supports with dashed lines, and complex attacks with dotted lines.
Here, a 2 supports a 3 , which attacks a 4 , creating a supported attack from a 2 to a 4 . Another supported attack on a 4 comes from a 1 , a supporter of a 2 . There's a secondary attack from a 3 to a 5 and a mediated one from a 6 to a 4 .
Recently, a study of three types of support-deductive, necessary, and evidential-has been conducted. 10 The former two types are quite strong notions and, as shown in the analysis, dual to each other. If a deductively supports b, then b must be accepted whenever a is accepted. Necessary support between a and b means that accepting a is a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) precondition for accepting b.
The notion of evidential support was first developed in evidential argumentation systems (EASs). 26 This approach builds on a generalization of Dung AFs, in which sets of arguments rather than single arguments might be needed to attack another argument. 9 In addition, the frameworks introduce a distinction between prima facie and ordinary arguments. The former can be accepted without further requirements. The support of the latter must be rooted in the prima facie arguments to be considered valid. Otherwise, it can't be accepted, and it isn't even considered a valid attacker. Thus the resulting semantics are stronger versions of the Dung semantics that impose a type of grounding on the arguments. A survey on various types of support in argumentation is available in further work. 27 Research on bipolar argumentation frameworks has certainly demonstrated that going beyond the attack relation is interesting and useful. On the other hand, it's apparent from the literature that there's no such thing as a single interpretation of support. We can easily think of further interpretations, not among the three we briefly discussed. For instance, an argument may strengthen another one without guaranteeing its acceptance as required for deductive support. We can also think of situations in which different notions need to be combined in flexible ways. Finally, in all bipolar frameworks so far, there's the hidden assumption that conflict is stronger than support. This means that no matter the support that an argument receives, it still must be defended from incoming attacks. It thus appears useful to have frameworks that-rather than being built on a fixed interpretation of supportmake it possible to specify exactly, for each argument, in what way support and attack interact. This is precisely the functionality provided by abstract dialectical frameworks.
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
Gerhard Brewka and Stefan Woltran proposed the abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) as a generalization of Dung-style AFs. 28 The idea behind ADFs is to allow not only abstract arguments, but also highly flexible and abstract relations. This is achieved by adding a specific acceptance condition C a to each argument a. More formally, an ADF is a directed graph whose nodes represent arguments, statements, or positions that can be accepted or not. The links represent dependencies: the status of a node s only depends on the status of its parents [denoted par(s)]-that is, nodes with a direct link to s. In addition, each node s has an associated acceptance condition C s specifying the exact conditions under which s is accepted. C s is a function assigning to each subset of par(s) one of the truth values t, f. Intuitively, if for some R ⊆ par(s) we have C s (R) = t, then s will be accepted, provided the nodes in R are accepted and those in par(s)\ R aren't accepted. In many cases, it's convenient to represent the acceptance conditions as propositional formulas. 29 For this reason, we frequently use a logical representation of ADFs (S, L, C) where C is a collection {ϕ s } s∈s of formulas expressing the Boolean functions from Definition 6.
Acceptance conditions can specify arbitrary relationships between arguments and their parents, thus allowing us to model complex interactions. A case in which an argument a can only be successfully attacked if two attacking arguments b and c are jointly accepted can be easily expressed with a condition ϕ a = ¬b ∨ ¬c. Dung's standard AFs can be recovered as the special case in which the acceptance condition of an argument, say a, is defined as the formula ¬c 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬c n where c 1 , . . . , c n are all arguments attacking a.
Example 3.
A representation of the Dung framework from Figure 1 in terms of an ADF is depicted in Figure  3a and formally given as a 2 ), (a 3 , a 2 ), (a 3 , a 4 ), (a 4 , a 3 ) , (a 4 , a 5 ), (a 5 , a 5 )}, and C = {a 1 : T, a 2 : ¬a 1 ∧ ¬a 3 , a 3 : ¬a 4 , a 4 :¬a 3 , a 5 : ¬a 4 ∧ ¬a 5 }.
As the definition of acceptance conditions suggests, ADFs can naturally express much more. Consider the framework depicted in Figure 3b : a 4 ), (a 4 , a 3 ) , (a 5 , a 4 ), (a 6 , a 5 ), (a 6 , a 6 )} and C = {a 1 : T, a 2 : ¬a 1 ∨ a 3 , a 3 : ¬a 4 , a 4 : ¬a 3 ∨ ¬a 5 , a 5 : a 6 , a 6 : ¬a 6 }. The relation between a 2 and its parents is an example of a group support similar to the one presented in EAS. 26 This means that accepting either a 1 or a 3 is sufficient for a 2 ; we do not have to commit to both. Attack by a set of arguments-that is, where more arguments are needed for a successful attack 9 -is carried out by a 3 and a 5 on a 4 . Finally, a 5 is (necessarily) supported by a 6 .
The semantics of ADFs in the original paper 28 were later generalized and further developed in various directions, including both extension 13 and labeling-based 30, 31 ones. In the first approach, a conflict-free extension is a set of arguments having their acceptance condition satisfied. Admissibility generalizes the original intuition from Dung by making sure that the extension has the power to discard undesired arguments. In the labelingbased approach, the definition of ADF semantics is based on the notion of a model. A (two-valued) interpretation v-a mapping from arguments to the truth values t and f-is a model of an ADF whenever v maps exactly those statements to t whose acceptance conditions are satisfied under v. The definition of grounded, complete, preferred, and stable semantics is then derived from an analysis in terms of three-valued interpretations, where an additional truth value u (undefined) is used. A key notion is the following consensus operator: for an ADF D and a three-valued interpretation v, the operator Γ D returns the (threevalued) interpretation Γ D (v), which assigns to each statement s the consensus truth value for its acceptance formula ϕ s , where the consensus takes into account all possible two-valued interpretations w that extend the input valuation v. The relevant semantical notions are derived from this operator. For instance, the grounded model of D is defined as the least fixpoint of Γ D . Further technical details 30, 31 and a comparison of the extension and labeling-based approaches 13 are available in relevant sources. However, we want to emphasize that the ADF semantics are actually proper generalizations of the original Dung semantics in the sense that they treat ADFs corresponding to AFs in exactly the same way as defined by Dung.
ADFs also provide a new handle on the treatment of preferences, 32, 33 values, and audiences. 34 As shown in the original work, 28 preferences on links between statements can directly be used in the definition of acceptance conditions. In the further developed work, 30 a treatment of preferences among arguments in the style of PAFs has been introduced. A prioritized ADF (PADF) consists of a prioritized set of arguments, a set of support links, and a set of attack links. A PADF is then compiled to a standard ADF. The approach is shown to be a proper generalization of PAFs. Similar generalizations of VAFs are straightforward. The same paper 30 also proposes a new approach to argumentation with dynamic preferences which, rather than being given in advance, are a matter of debate themselves. In a nutshell, dynamic preferences are handled as follows. We first guess a (stable, preferred, or grounded) extension M. We assume some nodes in M carry preference information. We extract this information and check whether M can be reconstructed under this preference information, thus verifying that the preferences represented in the model itself were taken into account adequately to construct the model.
The original work shows how legal proof standards (which play an essential role in legal reasoning) can be modeled using ADFs. 28 ADFs have also been used to reconstruct the much-cited Carneades system. 8, 35 The reconstruction not only puts Carneades on a safe formal ground, but it also allows the somewhat unrealistic restriction of the original system to acyclic argumentation scenarios to be relaxed. This shows the potential of ADFs as systems for generalizing not just abstract frameworks, but also more logic-based approaches.
A s for future work, it seems fruitful to continue the recent research on ADF semantics 13, 30 with a particular focus on the limits of expressiveness. Another interesting, so far unexplored, aspect is to switch the language of the acceptance conditions. So far, these conditions describe relations between arguments in terms of standard propositional logic. Moving to temporal, modal, or even nonmonotonic logic for the interpretation of the acceptance conditions offers new exciting research perspectives in the area of formal argumentation.
